(35) God is not able to make a mistake of any kind. The fact that these free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor against his goodness; for he could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by excising the possibility of moral good. (36) God is not able to contradict himself. We can start by granting Plantinga the possibility of trans-world depravity. the terrible pain, suffering, and untimely death caused by events like fire, flood, landslide, hurricane, earthquake, tidal wave, and famine and by diseases like cancer, leprosy and tetanus—as well as crippling defects and deformities like blindness, deafness, dumbness, shriveled limbs, and insanity by which so many sentient beings are cheated of the full benefits of life. Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the logical problem of evil. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. It may be exceedingly unlikely or improbable that a certain set of statements should all be true at the same time. If you took away our free will, we would no longer be the kinds of creatures we are. Based on the old logical problem of evil which has been addressed since a long time ago, I have certain objection to its premise. Is it possible? If there is any blame that needs to go around, it may be that some of it should go to Mackie and other atheologians for claiming that the problem of evil was a problem of inconsistency. So, the existence of evil and suffering makes theists’ belief in the existence of a perfect God irrational. U. S. A. In this world God has given creatures morally significant free will without any strings attached. The final problem of evil is the emotional problem of evil. Statements (6) through (8) jointly imply that if the perfect God of theism really existed, there would not be any evil or suffering. In my opinion, the Logical Problem of Evil (LPE) is the strongest argument there is against the existence of God, yet it is surprisingly weak, as I will show you. But it seems like we can generate a strengthened, revenge-style, logical problem of evil in the following way. In fact, since W3 is a world without evil of any kind and since merely wanting to lie or steal is itself a bad thing, the people in W3 would not even be able to have morally bad thoughts or desires. If God is going to causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong in W3, there is no way that he could allow them to be free in a morally significant sense. That is, that person would not be able to choose any bad option even if they wanted to. Plantinga, however, doesn’t take God’s omnipotence to include the power to do the logically impossible. (29) God is not able to fail to know what is right. Each of these things seems to be absolutely, positively impossible. What is Plantinga's argument against the logical problem of evil? This is precisely what atheologians claim to be able to do. Omnipotence, according to Plantinga, is the power to do anything that is logically possible. Since he did not do so, God did something blameworthy by not preventing or eliminating evil and suffering (if indeed God exists at all). A higher moral duty—namely, the duty of protecting the long-term health of her child—trumps the lesser duty expressed by (21). He suggests the following as a possible morally sufficient reason: (MSR1) God’s creation of persons with morally significant free will is something of tremendous value. Whats the answer? God is pictured as being in a situation much like that of Mrs. Jones: she allowed a small evil (the pain of a needle) to be inflicted upon her child because that pain was necessary for bringing about a greater good (immunization against polio). So, when they do perform right actions, they should not be praised. (14) God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. As an example, a critic of Plantinga's idea of "a mighty nonhuman spirit" causing natural evils may concede that the existence of such a being is not … Logical Consistency and the Logical Problem of Evil, Divine Omnipotence and the Free Will Defense, Other Responses to the Logical Problem of Evil. The LPE in its most basic form is a sort of trilemma, where supposedly only two of the three premises can be consistently held at any one time. It was, after all, Mackie himself who characterized the problem of evil as one of logical inconsistency: Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another. He’d like to help, but he doesn’t have the power to do anything about evil and suffering. If W3 is possible, then the complaint lodged by Flew and Mackie above that God could (and therefore should) have created a world full of creatures who always did what is right is not answered.